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Abstract 
Interest payable on borrowed funds or on amounts owing by reason of the operation of 
the law (for example interest that may be payable on statutory debts such as tax owing) in 
relation to an income earning activity is a significant (potential) deductible expense 
throughout the Commonwealth. The traditional “form” approach derived from the 
leading decision IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1 requires that the underlying 
transaction giving rise to the interest, and the interest itself, be characterised according to 
the legal rights and obligations created evident from the objective intention of the parties. 
On the other hand, an “economic substance” approach allows for the same 
characterisation to arise having regard to the economic consequences that flow from the 
transaction. These issues have been considered and the movement towards the 
development of a conceptual framework which relies on commercial legal forms and 
absorbs this into its measurement and recognition basis.   
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I. Introduction 
 
Overview 
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Interest payable on borrowed funds or on amounts owing by reason of the operation of 
the law (for example interest that may be payable on statutory debts such as taxes due) in 
relation to an income earning activity is a significant (potential) deductible expense 
throughout the Commonwealth.2 In the situation where public policy (or in Civil Law 
jurisdictions – fraus legis or abus de droit)3 – a priori – would lead to the conclusion that 
an interest deduction should denied (for instance where it relates to a tax avoidance 
scheme or it might be used to pay a tax debt), two important issues arise. The first issue is 
how the taxpayer, the taxing authority and the Court may characterise the underlying 
transaction and interest as a question of law, prior to the application of the specific taxing 
legislation that may apply (“the characterisation issue”). The second issue is then of 
course how that specific taxing legislation (a deduction rule in the case of interest in the 
wide sense) is interpreted and applied by the taxpayer, the taxing authority and the Court 
(“the legislative issue”).  
 
As noted above the reason why both of these issues are important is that it might be 
possible to argue that the initial characterisation of the transaction or the subsequent 
application of the specific interest deduction rule should be undertaken in such a way 
                                                 
2 Australia: – interest is deductible under the general deduction rule, s 8-1 Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 (Cth Aust) herein “ITAA97”. See also Ure v FCT 81 ATC 4100, FCT v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153 
and Ronpibon Tin NL and Tongkah Compound NL v FCT (1949) 8 ATD 431;Canada:interest is deductible 
under a specific deduction rule , s 20(1)(c) Income Tax Act (Can) herein “ITA”). See Shell Canada Ltd v 
Canada 96 DTC 6121. New Zealand: - interest is deductible on largely the same basis as Australia, the 
combined effect of s DB 6(1) and s DA 1(1) Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ) herein “IT07” is essentially that 
the general deduction rule must be satisfied. See also CIR v Banks (1978) 3 NZTC 61, 236, Buckley & 
Young Ltd v CIR (1978) 3 NZTC 61,271, Public Trustee v COT [1938] NZLR 436, Pacific Rendezvous Ltd 
v CIR (1986) 8 NZTC 5,146 and CIR v Brierley (1990) 12 NZTC 7,184. United Kingdom: - the advent of 
the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (UK) herein “ITEPA 2003 and the Income Tax (Trading 
and Other Income) Act 2005 (UK) herein “ITTOIA 2005” saw the abandonment of the schedular system, 
except in so far as it was applicable to corporation tax. The main heads of charge are now: (a) trading 
income – ITTOIA 2005, Pt. 2; (b) property income – ITTOIA 2005, Pt. 3; (c) savings and investment 
income – ITTOIA 2005, Pt. 4; (d) miscellaneous income – ITTOIA 2005, Pt. 5; (e) employment income – 
ITEPA 2003, Pt. 2 and 3, 6 and 7; and (f) pension income – ITEPA 2003, Pt. 9; and ITEPA 2003, Pt. 10.r. 
As an example for trading income (ITTOIA 2005, Pt. 2) interest paid on loans to, or overdrafts of, a 
business is a deductible expense, provided the loan was made wholly and exclusively for business purposes 
Interest paid out is always a revenue rather than a capital expense, whatever the nature of the loan (ITTOIA 
2005, s 29 also s 34). In Scorer (HMIT) v Olin Energy Systems Ltd (1985) TC 592, 611 Walton J approved 
the approach taken by the Special Commissioners regarding the payment of interest for the purposes of a 
trade, namely: 
 
“… we take the view that the question whether interest was paid for the purposes of a trade must depend 
upon whether the loan, on which the interest was paid, was incurred for the purposes of that trade. It does 
not necessarily follow that the purposes of the loan can be ascertained by looking at the immediate use to 
which the borrower applies the money. The question is one of fact to be decided on the evidence available 
in each case.” 
 
See generally CCH (UK), Tax Reporter para 215-000.  
3See Prebble J. et al, “Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax Law with the Civil 
LawDoctrine of Abuse of Rights” Bulletin for International Taxation (2008) April 151, at 154-155. 
 
 
(generally by the taxing authority or the Court) that denies the deduction for policy 
reasons such as equity,4 adequacy5 or efficiency.6 
 
Here, an analogy is the situation of fines. Although a fine may be incurred as part of an 
income earning process and thus be an “outgoing incurred”,7 famous cases such as IRC v 
Alexander von Glehn and Co Ltd8 “re-characterise” fines factually as private expenditure 
to deny deductibility on no sensible conceptual or logical basis. 9 
                                                 
4See for instance United States Government Accountability Office, Understanding the Tax Reform Debate: 
Background, Criteria and Questions (September 2005) [28GAO-05-1009SP] pp 27-28. Horizontal equity 
requires that taxpayers who have similar ability to pay taxes receive similar tax treatment. Targeted tax 
expenditures, such as deductions and credits, could affect horizontal equity throughout the tax system 
because they may favor certain types of economic behavior over others by taxpayers with similar financial 
conditions. For example, two taxpayers with the same income and identical houses may be taxed differently 
if one owns his or her house and the other rents because mortgage interest on owner-occupied housing is 
tax deductible. Vertical equity deals with differences in ability to pay. Subjective judgments about vertical 
equity are reflected in debates about the overall fairness of the rate structures, where for this example, 
income is used as the measure of ability pay. 
5See Yorio E., “The President’s Tax Proposals: A major Step in the Right Direction” (1985) 53 Fordham L 
Rev 1255, at 1263. Yorio notes the final requisite of a sound tax system is that it provide revenues adequate 
to meet the needs of the public sector. Precisely how much revenue must be raised at any time to satisfy the 
adequacy criterion in this general sense will depend on factors such as society’s view of the proper balance 
between the public and private sectors, external threats posed to the society, and society’s judgment on the 
need or advisablity of incurring debt or printing money rather than raising revenue as a means of financing 
government spending. In its narrower sense, the adequacy criterion refers to the aggregate revenue effect of 
a particular provision in the tax law. If a proposed change in the legislation will result in a significant loss 
in revenues, the criterion is badly served. If the proposal will generate additional revenues, the criterion is 
satisfied.  
628GAO-05-1009SP, n 4 at 37. Economic efficiency can be thought of as the effectiveness with which an 
economy utilizes its resources to satisfy people’s preferences. Economists generally agree that (from the 
perspective of efficiency and ignoring other considerations, such as equity) markets are often the best 
method for determining what goods and services should be produced and how resources should be 
allocated. Self-interest is assumed to motivate resource owners to try to use their resources in a manner that 
realizes the highest return. When resources are directed to their highest valued uses the economy is said to 
be efficient. 
7See the phraseology in the leading decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in CIR v Banks [1978] 2 
NZLR 472, at 475 per Richardson J: “The statutory requirement is that the expenditure be “incurred in 
gaining or producing the assessable income”. That has to be judged as at the time that the taxpayer became 
definitively committed to the expenditure for which deduction is sought (F.C. of T. v Flood (1953) 88 
C.L.R. 492; King v C. of I.R. (1973) 1 NZTC 61,107 . Where the expenditure involves an element of 
volition and is itself of a revenue rather than a capital character, consideration of the object or purpose of 
the expenditure may, in many instances, be determinative of deductibility.”  
8(1919) 12 TC 233 
9New Zealand Inland Revenue IS 09/01 FINES AND PENALTIES — INCOME TAX DEDUCTIBILITY 
[Interpretation Statement IS 09/01 (IS 09/01)] Date of issue: 15 October 2009: It followed the principles in 
the earlier English case of Strong v Woodifield (Surveyor of Taxes) 5 TC 215 (which it acknowledged was 
in a different context) and was also consistent with the decision in IRC v Warnes [1919] KB 444. 
Alexander von Glehn  involved a company that carried on an exporting business and was fined £3,000 for 
exporting goods to Russia without taking appropriate precautions to ensure their ultimate destination was 
not enemy territory. The company’s claim to deduct that sum was rejected by the English Court of Appeal. 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal considered that, because the fine was imposed on the company 
for breaking the law, the expense could not be connected with or arising out of the company’s trade. In 
Mann v Nash (1932) 16 TC 523, 529, Rowlatt J, referred to Alexander von Glehn, and observed that: 
 
 
 
 
To guide us in these dangerous shoals a good “chart” is required. Like the Joint 
Conceptual Framework Project (International Financial Reporting Standards) for 
financial reporting, a conceptual framework for income tax system design and operation 
is needed within which the specific treatment of interest can be examined. This is the 
objective of this article. 
 
The author’s conclusions 
 
The conclusion reached in this article is that the current design of the Commonwealth 
income tax systems reviewed by the authors dictates that transactions are characterised 
according the their legal form (regardless of any public policy considerations) and that 
the subsequent application of the specific deduction regime is undertaken adhering also to 
the legal form of the transaction without any statutory recharacterisation.10  
                                                                                                                                                 
“the decision in the case was that payment of those penalties was nothing to do with the trade or business; it 
was not an expense for the earning of the profits, but it was an expense in the form of an inconvenience 
which supervened later when the profits were made, because illegality had been committed in the course of 
earning them.” 
 
The early United Kingdom decisions suggest that a deduction is denied on the basis that the required 
statutory connection or nexus between the fine or penalty and trading is absent – see paras 11, 12 and 12. 
10Per Richardson J in Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154 at 159-160: 
 
“The legal principles governing the ascertainment of the true legal character of a transaction are now well 
settled and for recent discussions in this Court it is sufficient to refer to Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2) [1978] 2 
NZLR 136; Buckley & Young Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1978] 2 NZLR 485; Marac Finance 
Ltd v Virtue [1981] 1 NZLR 586; and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Smythe [1981] 1 NZLR 673. It 
frequently happens that the same result in a business sense can be attained by two different legal 
transactions. The parties are free to choose whatever lawful arrangements will suit their purposes. The true 
nature of their transaction can only be ascertained by careful consideration of the legal arrangements 
actually entered into and carried out. Not on an assessment of the broad substance of the transaction 
measured by the results intended and achieved; or of the overall economic consequences to the parties; or 
of the legal consequences which would follow from an alternative course which they could have adopted 
had they chosen to do so. The forms adopted cannot be dismissed as mere machinery for effecting the 
purposes of the parties. It is the legal character of the transaction that is actually entered into and the legal 
steps which are followed which are decisive. That requires consideration of the whole of the contractual 
arrangement and if the transaction is embodied in a series of inter-related agreements they must be 
considered together and one may be read to explain the others. In characterising the transaction regard is 
had to surrounding circumstances: not to deny or contradict the written agreement but in order to 
understand the setting in which it was made and to construe it against that factual background having 
regard to the genesis and objectively the aim of the transaction. The only exceptions to the principle that the 
legal consequences of a transaction turn on the terms of the legal arrangements actually entered into and 
carried out are: (i) where the essential genuineness of the transaction is challenged and sham is established; 
and (ii) where there is a statutory provision, such as s 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976, mandating a broader 
or different approach which applies in the circumstances of the particular case. A document may be 
brushed aside if and to the extent that it is a sham in two situations: (a) where the document does not reflect 
the true agreement between the parties in which case the cloak is removed and recognition given to their 
common intentions (as happened in Marac Finance Ltd v Virtue); and (b) where the document was bona 
fide in inception but the parties have departed from their initial agreement while leaving the original 
documentation to stand unaltered.” 
 
 
 
For example, if a taxpayer incurs a genuine liability for interest on a loan of money that is 
then used to fund an income earning activity that turns out to infringe the local town 
planning ordinance and is subject to a fine, the taxing authority and the Court may not 
deny that the loan of money has arisen according to its legal form and that any specific 
deduction rule for interest should not be applied by reason simply of the illegal nature of 
the income earning process.11 
 
The reason why form prevails at both the characterisation step and then the legislative 
step is that the scheme and purpose of the income tax systems reviewed is typically based 
on a transactional measurement system as compared with an economic comprehensive 
tax base model (Haig/Simons).12  
 
The schema of this article 
 
This article is divided into eight parts. After the introduction in Part One, Part Two 
examines some preliminary economic aspects of interest. Part Three then develops the 
conceptual framework. Part Four moves on to apply the conceptual framework by 
initially considering the tax administration cycle by which in practice the characterisation 
issue (Part Five) and then the interpretation issue (Part Six) arise. Part Seven looks at the 
same issue under IFRS while Part Eight presents the authors’ conclusions. 
 
II. Economic aspects of interest 
 
Interest in classical economic terms is described as “the payment for the use of funds 
employed in the production of capital, it is measured as a percent per year of the value of 
the funds tied up in the capital”.13 Keynes observed this to be the factor which brings the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
11See for example the deductibility of the legal cost of defending allegations of unethical and fraudulent 
building practices before a Royal Commission appointed by the Government of Western Australia on 28 
January 1953 – FCT v Snowden & Willson Pty Ltd (1958) 99 CLR 431. Taylor J at p 452 noted “The final 
observation which I wish to make is concerned with the argument that, as the expenditure was incurred in 
an endeavour to rebut the charges of fraud which were implicit in the allegations made by Mr. Oldfield, the 
company is not entitled to the deduction claimed. It was sought to support this argument by reference to 
cases concerned with legal costs and penalties incurred in criminal proceedings. It is, I think, sufficient to 
say that there is no analogy between the two classes of cases and, accordingly, that there is no substance in 
this submission. (See Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Warnes & Co. (1919) 2 KB 444; Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue v. von Glehn & Co. Ltd. (1920) 2 KB 553; Minister of Finance v. Smith (1927) AC 193, at 
pp 197, 198).” See also Keesling F.M., “Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax” (1958) 5 UCLA L Rev 
26 at 33. The author notes that “If receipts are to be included in gross income irrespective of the legality or 
illegality of their source, consistency requires that expenses, losses and other items should be deductible 
irrespective of the legality or illegality of the transaction in which it is incurred. If illegal income is to be 
taxed, illegal expenses should be deducted.” See Commissioner v Doyle 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956). 
12See infra n 20.  
13Baumol W.J., Blinder A.S., 2011, Economics Principles and Policy (Third Edition, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich International Edition p 403. 
 
 
demand for investment and the willingness to save into equilibrium with one another.14 
Investment is considered to be “the flow of resources into the production of new capital. 
It is the labor, steel, and other inputs devoted to the construction of factories, warehouses, 
railroads, and other pieces of capital during some period of time”.15  The “rate of 
interest” is the price at which funds can be rented (borrowed). And like other factor 
prices, the rate of interest is determined by supply and demand. In business, loans are 
used primarily to finance investment. The business executive who “rents” (borrows) 
funds in order to finance an investment and pays interest in return, the funds really 
represent an intermediate step toward the acquisition of machines, buildings, inventories, 
and other forms of physical capital that the firm will purchase.16 The market 
determination of interest rates is done through the downward sloping demand curve for 
funds and the upward supply of funds. The downward-sloping demand curve for funds is 
considered as so “as the rate of interest on borrowing rises, more and more investment 
that previously looked profitable starts to look unprofitable. The demand for borrowing 
for investment purposes, therefore, is lower at higher rates of interest”.17 The supply of 
funds is considered using similar principles than the demand side where the lenders are 
consumers, banks and other businesses. “Funds are lent out are usually returned to the 
owner (with interest) only over a period of time. Loans will look better to lenders when 
they bear higher interest rates, so it is natural to think of the supply schedule for loans as 
being upward sloping – at higher rates of interest, lenders supply more funds”.18 Such a 
supply schedule is shown in the curve SS in Figure 1, where we also produce a demand 
curve DD.  
 
 
                                                 
14Keynes J.M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan) Cambridge 
University Press for Royal Economic Society 1936) Part I, Chapter 14.  
15Baumol and Blinder, n 13, p 403.  
16Baumol and Blinder, n 13, p 403. 
17Baumol and Blinder, n 13, p 405.  
18Baumol and Blinder, n 13, p 406. 
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Figure 1 Equilibrium in the market for Loans 
 
Here at the interest rate I, the quantity of loans supplied equals the quantity demanded.    
 
III. Ectopia – the Haig-Simons concept of income and the need for 
the transactional approach 
 
In Part Three the authors develop a conceptual framework which describes the basic 
structure of the Commonwealth tax systems that are reviewed. The analysis starts with 
the Haig/Simons comprehensive definition of income and then modifies that approach to 
illustrate how in practice the Commonwealth income tax systems operationalise this 
concept into a workable tax system. It is in fact the practical limitations of a pure 
Haig/Simons tax system that force tax policy makers to use a transactional approach in 
the measurement of income and also by necessity the reliance on a form approach. 
 
The Haig-Simons comprehensive tax base 
 
It is generally accepted that the “Haig/Simons” comprehensive definition of income is the 
paradigm that tax reformers move toward – particularly in the Commonwealth and the 
United States of America. The definition states:19 
  
                                                 
19See Simons H., Personal Income Taxation (1938) pp 61-62, 206; Haig [Haig R., (ed), The Federal 
Income Tax (1921) 7] defined personal income as the “money value of the net accretion to one’s economic 
power between two points of time.” 
 
 
“Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights 
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights 
between the beginning and end of the period in question.” 
 
From a normative perspective it is well recognised that the “best” measure of income for 
tax reform purposes is that developed by Haig/Simons – commonly known as 
comprehensive income base or economic definition of income.20,21 
 
The McIntyre formulation of an operational Haig/Simons tax base 
 
Broadly speaking economic or comprehensive income for a period represents the 
difference in wealth between the beginning and end of the period, together with 
consumption during the period. Under this approach income is measured as the sum of 
consumption and the net change in wealth during a period. Haig/Simons income (HSY) 
(as noted above) is usually defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the taxpayer’s personal 
consumption (C) and (2) the difference between their net worth at the end of the 
assessment period (NW1) and their net worth at the start of the period (NW0).22 
 
This may be represented in the flowing equation:23 
 
(1) HSY = C + ( NW1 – NW0 ) 
 
McIntyre notes that:24  
 
“Although commentators may occasionally indulge the fantasy that a tax department 
could measure the change in each taxpayer’s net worth, no one pretends that consumption 
could be measured directly. Instead, the assumption commonly made is that a tax 
department would compute consumption indirectly from presumably knowable 
information about a taxpayer’s income sources.”  
 
Thus, the following formula more accurately presents a tax system that uses the HSY 
concept by resort to transactions and asset measurement:25 
                                                 
20Commonwealth of Australia, Architecture of Australia’s tax and transfer system (2008) p 331. 
21Commonwealth of Australia, n 21, p331. The project sets out the following formula: 
 
Y1 = rRt +iKt +wLt 
 
where R is land, L is labour and K is capital. The earnings of these factors (of individuals) when added up 
for the entire population for a given time period (t) equates to the national income Y (where r is the return 
to land, i is the return to capital and w is the return to labour). 
22 McIntyre M, “Implications of US Tax Reform for Distributive Justice” (1988) 5 Australian Tax Forum, 
219 at 234-246. 
23 McIntyre MJ, “Algebraic Expressions of Haig/Simons Income, Haig/Simons Consumption and Realized 
Income, (1984) 30 3 Wayne Law Review at p 1087 
24 at p 1087 
25 at p 1087 
 
 
 
(2) HSY = S + (OA1 – OA0) + (NA – AC) – E – PD 
 
Under equation two: 
 
S = total realized income, including wages, investment income, realized gains, 
windfalls, and gifts; 
OA1 – OA0 = the unrealized gains on assets held both at the start and the end of 
the taxable period, measured by subtracting the market value of old assets at the start of 
the period (OA0) from the market value of these same assets at the end of the period 
(OA1); 
NA – AC = the unrealized gain on assets obtained during the taxable period, 
measured by subtracting the acquisition costs of those assets (AC) from the market value 
as of the end of the period of the newly acquired assets (NA); 
E = the total of the taxpayer’s profit-seeking expenses (eg, payments that are 
intended to produce income and that do not either increase the value of an asset already 
owned by the taxpayer or produce an asset with utility that extends beyond the taxable 
period); 
PD = any personal deductions, such as the deduction for state and local income 
taxes, that are judged to fall outside a refined definition of consumption. 
 
The McIntyre Haig/Simons model in operation 
 
McIntyre, observes that all26 income tax systems impose tax only on realized income.27 
An income tax based generally on Haig/Simons concepts which adopts a realization 
requirement for accrued gains would define its tax base as the sum of (1) realized income 
accruing in the current period and (2) income that accrued in prior periods but was 
realized in the current period less (3) depreciation, expenses relating to the earning of 
realized income and personal deductions.28  
 
This can be represented by our last equation: 
 
(3) RY = S + SA0 – B0 - D – Er – PD 
 
Under equation three: 
 
SA0 = the market value at the start of the period of assets on hand and sold during 
period; 
B0 = the taxpayer’s basis in assets sold during the taxable year, as of the start of 
the year; 
                                                 
26 at p 1090, however, in some jurisdictions such as Australia there are examples as Division 16E relating to 
securities interest and now Division 230 ITAA 1977 relating to financial instruments in which the 
characterization of the transaction has been legislated via provisions of the Income Tax Act.  
27 (RY) 
28 at p 1090 
 
 
D = the deduction for depreciation, representing the taxpayer’s estimated loss in 
value of wasting assets held at the end of the period; 
Er = that portion of the profit-seeking expenses (E) allocable to the earning of 
realized income; and 
All other terms are as defined in equations (1) and (2). 
 
Expanding the McIntyre/Haig/Simons model in a Commonwealth context 
 
(4) RY1 = (N + II +RG + W&G) + SA0 – B0 - D – Er – PD 
 
Under equation three: 
 
N = wages during period; 
II = Investment income during the taxable year not included in SA0 and B0 ; 
RG = Realized gains during the taxable year which does not include assets 
included in SA0 and B0; 
W&G = Windfalls and gifts received during the year; and 
All other terms are as defined in equations (1), (2) and (3). 
 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom have all introduced taxation systems designed 
to more or less implement the Haig/Simons model. New Zealand has also adopted the 
same broad conceptual framework for the design of its income tax system with the 
omission however, of a comprehensive capital gains tax. Nonetheless it is a valid 
proposition to say that the Haig/Simons comprehensive tax base is the conceptual 
framework upon which all four jurisdictions base tax design and policy.29 The major 
shortcoming however of the McIntyre/Haig/Simons model presented under equation 
three is that it fails to deal with the distinction between inflows from revenue producing 
activities (such a wages or salaries), capital gains (in the true sense of the term – inflows 
that arise from the realization of items that produce the framework from which revenue is 
made) and windfalls. For an example of the judicial recognition of this trichotomy, we 
find in the Australian Full Federal Court decision FCT v La Rosa30 Hely J notes (the 
issue was whether a stock of cash fell within one of the three categories):31 
 
“Whether money is held as a revenue asset or as a capital asset or on private account 
depends on the circumstances of the holding. A taxpayer who stores money in the ground 
or in a safe or in the bank may hold the money as capital if it is part of the structure of the 
business, or if it is held for use when needed in the business and is in the nature of a 
capital reserve.” 
 
                                                 
29Australia: Asprey K.W., Australia Commonwealth Taxation Review Committee, Full Report (January 31 
1975) para 23.82. Canada: Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission, 1966) Vol 1 pp 
9-10. New Zealand: Although New Zealand has not yet introduced a capital gains tax as yet the 
comprehensive tax base is used as a model for reform – see for instance Inland Revenue Department 
Supplementary Briefing Papers: Tax Policy (1999) Vol 1, p 16. United Kingdom Royal Commission on the 
Taxation of Profits and Income Final Report (1955, Cmd. 9474), pp 355-356. 
30129 FCR 494. 
31129 FCR 494 at 502-503.  
 
 
In La Rosa32 Hely J cites with approval Professor Ross Parsons in his seminal treatise 
Income Taxation in Australia33 to support his reasoning. Although taken from another 
portion of Professor Parsons’s treatise, the following quotation outlines the proposition 
Justice Hely based his reasoning upon:34 
 
“(iii) An expense that is relevant to income derivation will be a working expense if it 
relates to the process by which income is derived. It will not be a working expense, and 
may be described as a capital expense, if it relates to the structure of the activity that 
produces income … 
(iv) An expense which is not relevant to income derivation will not be a working 
expense, and may be described as a private or domestic expense.”  
 
This same trichotomy as explained by Parsons logically applies both in the case of 
inflows as it does with outflows. In fact it would be absurd to suggest otherwise. Take for 
example the case of a taxpayer carrying on the business of banking or insurance. It has 
been held in a long established line of decisions that the realization of a security held by 
such a taxpayer when that security is part of its working capital or reserve fund will be 
itself on revenue account even though the lending of money at interest (or in the case of 
an insurance company the derivation of premiums) is the core activity. Any gain in such 
a case is revenue while a loss is deductible. In Union Bank of Australia v CoT35 Sim J 
observed: 
 
“It is on the principle here stated that the question must be determined whether a loss 
made in realizing an investment is to be treated as a loss of capital or as a loss made in 
carrying on a business. …. The realization from time to time of these investments appears 
to be part of the ordinary business of a banker, just as much as the realization of a 
security given by a customer in connection with an advance. …. It follows as a necessary 
result from this decision that if a loss had been made in the realization of the investment 
it could have been deducted from the gross profits as a loss incurred exclusively in the 
production of the assessable income of the company.” (author’s emphasis). 
 
The above discussion can usefully be shown in the following table: 
 
Transaction type Revenue account Capital account Private account 
Inflow Income Capital gain Windfall gain 
Outflow Deduction Capital cost Private cost 
Table One transaction type classification 
 
The phenomenon of Ectopia 
 
                                                 
32129 FCR 494 at 503. 
33Parsons R.W., Income Tax in Australia: Principles of Income, Deductions and Tax Accounting (1985 
Thomson Legal and Regulatory Limited, Sydney) para 5.13. 
34Parsons, n 32, para 5.13.  
35[1920] NZLR 649 at 656.  
 
 
There is already a well received body of academic literature that confirms the authors’ 
general point.36 Professor John Prebble37 posits as one of the great problems of income 
tax law and policy the distinction between the treatment of a transaction under the pure 
Haig/Simons model and that we see under the modified McIntyre/Haig/Simons model 
that we present.  
 
Professor Prebble observes that:38 
 
“As I have said, tax law generally taxes the results of legal transactions rather than their 
underlying economic effect. The courts are always telling us that tax law does not tax on 
the basis of economic equivalence. But the problem is deeper. In order to make income 
tax work at all, the law must make a number of assumptions that are not in fact correct, 
assumptions as to both the factual and the legal nature of the taxpayer’s income. The 
effect of these assumptions is that the base that the law taxes is removed even further 
from the facts of the case …. Which I call ‘ectopia’”. 
 
In the domain of the revenue and capital distinction Professor Prebble illustrates ectopia 
by reference to the two leading decisions of the High Court of Australia in Californian 
Oil Products Ltd v FCT39 and Heavy Minerals Pty Ltd v FCT.40 
 
In Californian Oil by agreement dated 16th November 1927, adopting and ratifying an 
agreement of 30th June 1927, the Atlantic Union Oil Co Ltd (AUL) appointed the 
Californian Oil Products Ltd (CPL) sole agent for the sale of petroleum products and 
lubricating oils and greases from time to time manufactured or acquired or dealt in by the 
principal, during a period of five years from 1st April 1928 to 31st March 1933, in the 
territory of New South Wales, excepting certain specified areas. By a subsequent 
agreement dated 11th October 1928, between the parties, the initial agency agreement 
was terminated. In consideration of such termination, the AUL agreed to pay to the CPL 
the sum of £70,000, payable by ten equal half-yearly instalments, without interest, of 
£7,000 each, the first of such instalments to be paid on 1st May 1929, and the remaining 
instalments to be paid at successive intervals thereafter of six months each. CPL 
covenanted that, as from the date of the signing of the termination agreement, it would 
not directly or indirectly handle or deal in petroleum products of any kind. And each of 
the parties released the other from all claims of every kind other than those arising under 
and by virtue of the provisions of this agreement. The Commissioner of Taxation 
assessed CPL as agent to income tax in respect of the sum of £14,000 received by it 
under the agreement of 11th October 1928 during the year which ended on 30th June 
                                                 
36Bittker B.I., “A “Comprehensive Tax Base’ as a Goal of Income Tax Reform” (1967) 80 Harv L Rev 925; 
McIntyre M.J., “A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure” (1980) 14 UC Davis L Rev79; 
Thuronyi V., “Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment” (1988) Duke LJ 1155.  
37Prebble J., “Income Taxation: A structure built on sand” Documentos de Trabaja Editados por el Instituto 
de Estudios Fiscales (2005) No 14/05, pp1-18.  
38Prebble, n 36, at 8-9.   
39(1934) 52 CLR 28.   
40(1966) 115 CLR 512.  
 
 
1931. The High Court held that the termination payments were on capital account. Dixon 
J for instance stating:41 
 
“In the present case the sum in question was paid as the consideration for the termination 
of the agency which constituted the only business carried on by the taxpayer company. It 
was ‘truly compensation for not carrying on their business.’ It comes within the 
principles expressed by Rowlatt J. in Chibbett v. Joseph Robinson & Sons [(1924) 9 TC 
at p 61] when he said: ‘A payment to make up for the cessation for the future of annual 
taxable profits is not itself an annual profit at all.’” 
 
The reasoning being that the payments presented inflows from the disposition of the only 
capital asset of the taxpayer, the agency agreement, from which it earned its commissions 
and the like. 
 
In Heavy Metals the taxpayer company had been formed in 1956 in New South Wales to 
undertake the operation of mining for a mineral known as “rutile”. To this end the 
taxpayer obtained a mining lease over an area of rutile rich land and installed plant and 
machinery. The capital structure in this case was clearly the lease, plant and machinery. 
The income earning operation was the extraction of rutile and sale to customers. The 
taxpayer entered into several long-term overseas contracts with users of rutile. Sadly the 
rutile market worldwide collapsed in 1957 and the various customers of the taxpayer 
negotiated an exit package in respect of their various contracts. The total compensation 
paid was £220,968 after expenses. This was not an insignificant sum in 1957 and the 
issue was whether this was trading income of the taxpayer. Windeyer J distinguished 
Californian Oil on the basis that in this case all that arose was receipt of trading profits 
from various customers in the form of compensation for future rutile sales and as 
cancellation of the supply agreements. By contrast in Californian Oil the entire structure 
(the agency) which earned the income (the commissions on AUL products sold to petrol 
stations and motor shops with New South Wales through the agency of CPL) had been 
disposed of. By contrast here the capital structure consisting of the leasehold, the plant 
and machinery remained intact. The Judge observed:42 
 
“The appellant sought to liken the moneys which the buyers paid to be released from 
their contracts to a price received as a consideration for going out of business as in 
Californian Oil Products Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1934] HCA 35; 
(1934) 52 CLR 28 . But there is no analogy. The taxpayer’s business was mining rutile 
and dealing in rutile. Its capital assets were the mining lease and the plant. After the 
contracts were cancelled it still had these. It was free to mine its rutile and to sell it if it 
could find buyers: and it tried to do so. The taxpayer was not put out of business by the 
cancellation of its overseas contracts. It did not go out of business when they were 
cancelled. What happened is that because the price of rutile had drastically fallen it could 
not carry on its business at a profit.” 
 
                                                 
41(1934) 52 CLR 28 at 47.  
42(1966) 115 CLR 512 at 517. 
 
 
Having regard to the modified McIntyre/Haig/Simons model (on the assumption that 
capital gains are typically taxed at preferential rates and ring fenced) then clearly the 
effective rate of tax on the receipt in Californian Oil would be lower than that in Heavy 
Metals based on the distinction between the legal form of the two. This is Professor 
Prebble’s ectopia at work. Under a pure Haig/Simons tax base both receipts would be 
treated identically. Professor Prebble acknowledges however that because second best is 
what we use in practice then the two decisions were probably correctly decided:43 
 
“As I have explained, Windeyer J’s distinguishing of Californian Oil Products and his 
reasoning in Heavy Minerals were unexceptionable in law. The reason is that the High 
Court was not purporting to calculate Heavy Minerals’s tax liability on the basis of the 
profit from its actual economic business, but on the basis of the contracts that were used 
as the legal vehicle for that business and on the basis of the rights and duties that formed 
the legal context of the business. [Windeyer J] … was correct that from a legal point of 
view Heavy Minerals’s business remained intact, even though nobody wanted rutile at 
the price that they had to charge. On the other hand, Californian Oil Product’s business 
had depended on [one] … contractual right to buy products from the Union Oil 
Company. Once that right was gone there was no legal basis for their business.”  
 
Criticism of the “gap” that arises between the treatment of a transaction under a 
Haig/Simons tax base and one under the modified McIntyre/Haig/Simons tax base that 
the authors present in the conceptual framework should not give rise to criticism of the 
later model per se. All of the Commonwealth systems reviewed are forced to use a 
realized transaction tax base and then to distinguish between revenue, capital and private 
inflows and outflows as a matter of equity, certainty and simplicity and administrative 
practicality. 
 
Implications  
 
Having derived the conceptual framework in Part Three the authors now go on to predict 
how the transactional and interpretational issue should be resolved having regard to the 
scheme and purpose of the model presented at formula 4. Our initial prediction is that the 
transactional measurement basis of the tax base dictates that transactions themselves are 
characterized according to “common law”44 legal form and that the application of any 
specific deduction rule for interest should preserve that form when considering whether 
the particular transaction falls within the rule.  
 
IV. The conceptual framework and the assessment process 
 
                                                 
43Prebble, n 36, at 12.  
44 This also includes rules equity, or statute where appropriate. 
 
 
Preliminary 
 
In Part Four the authors attempt to operationalise the conceptual framework by 
considering formula 4 within the context of the standard assessment process seen 
throughout the Commonwealth. In other words we attempt to show how formula 4 may 
be applied in practice having regard to the tax administration cycle. 
 
The assessment function 
 
In each of the jurisdictions reviewed by the authors a yearly assessment of income tax is 
undertaken.45 Whether it is the taxpayer or the taxing authority that undertakes the initial 
assessment, the same basic process applies. Indeed in many of the situations that are the 
focus of this article, the assessment at issue may well be a re-assessment of a taxpayer’s 
affairs after some form of audit had arisen.46  
 
A good description of the role of the assessment phase in the tax administration cycle was 
given by Lord Dunedin in Whitney v IRC:47 
 
“Now, there are three stages in the imposition of a tax: there is the declaration of liability, 
that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property 
are liable. Next, there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That, 
ex hypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularizes the exact sum which a 
person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person does not 
voluntarily pay.” 
 
As to the assessment itself this involves three important steps, the finding of fact, the 
characterisation of the legal rights and obligations of the parties and finally the 
application of the specific statutory provisions.48  
 
Another description of the assessment process is found in the leading decision of 
Richardson J in CIR v Canterbury Frozen Meat Co Ltd49 where his Honour observes: 
 
                                                 
45Australia: self-assessment arises under s 166A(1) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth Aust). See also 
Case V10 88 ATC 154 at 156. Canada: the Minister of National Revenue undertakes an assessment under s 
152(1) ITA. New Zealand: self-assessment arises under s 92(1) Tax Administration Act 1994 (NZ) herein 
TAA. United Kingdom: self-assessment arises under for instance under s 9(1) Taxes Management Act 1970 
(UK). 
46See for example FCT v Riverside Road Pty Ltd (in liq) 90 ATC 4567.  
47 [1926] AC 37 at p 52. 
48Craven v White; IRC v Bowater Property Developments Ltd; Baylis v Gregory [1988] BTC 268 at 272 per 
Lord Keith “My Lords, in my opinion the nature of the principle to be derived from the three cases is this: 
the court must first construe the relevant enactment in order to ascertain its meaning; it must then analyse 
the series of transactions in question, regarded as a whole, so as to ascertain its true effect in law; and 
finally it must apply the enactment as construed to the true effect of the series of transactions and so decide 
whether or not the enactment was intended to cover it.” 
49CIR v Canterbury Frozen Meat Co Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 681 at 690. 
 
 
“The making of an assessment determines the indebtedness of the subject to the Crown. 
That liability is unqualified. Sanctions are provided for failure to pay. It follows that a 
decision which is tentative or provisional or subject to adjustment or conditional does not 
reflect the statutory scheme. In short, to constitute an assessment for income tax purposes 
the decision of the Commissioner must be definitive as to the liability of the taxpayer at 
the time it is made and final subject only to challenge through the objection process.” 
 
For instance in FCT v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd50 (a case from the High Court of Australia 
heavily relied upon by Richardson J in Canterbury Frozen Meats) the relevant 
“assessment” which was variously expressed to have been made “tentatively” or “subject 
to revision” or to be “finalized” was held not to be an assessment within the meaning of 
the legislation. 
 
In making an assessment, a decision affecting tax liability may be challenged in that the 
Commissioner did not follow a proper process in arriving at that decision. This equally 
applies where a reassessment is involved or a statutory disputes procedure is used. For 
instance under the New Zealand TAA Part 4A any adjustment proposed by the 
Commissioner after an audit must be initiated through the use of the Notice of Proposed 
Adjustment51 and is a statutory power amenable to judicial review under the New 
Zealand Judicature Amendment Act 1972.52 
 
“In making an assessment the Commissioner is required to exercise judgment. He or she 
is not entitled to act arbitrarily or in disregard of the law or facts known to the 
Commissioner (Lowe v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1981] 1 NZLR 326, 348; 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Walker [1963] NZLR 339).”53 (authors’ emphasis). 
 
To set the context for the ensuing discussion and to relate the assessment function to the 
conceptual framework the authors show this process by way of a diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Assessment function 
                                                 
50(1928) 42 CLR 39. 
51See s 89B 1 TAA.  
52Section 4(1) states “(1) On an application which may be called an application for review, the [High Court] 
may, notwithstanding any right of appeal possessed by the applicant in relation to the subject-matter of the 
application, by order grant, in relation to the exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise 
by any person of a statutory power, any relief that the applicant would be entitled to, in any one or more of 
the proceedings for a writ or order of or in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari or for a 
declaration or injunction, against that person in any such proceedings.”  
53CIR v Canterbury Frozen Meat Co Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 681 at 690. 
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As a “preface” to the application of the conceptual framework via its operationalisation 
using the standard assessment cycle the authors note the important observations of Lord 
Wilberforce in W T Ramsay v IRC.54 Firstly, on our prediction that the structure of the 
current Commonwealth tax systems mandates a formal approach in construing legal 
relations, Lord Wilberforce presaged this conclusion when he opined:55 
 
“Given that a document or transaction is genuine, the court cannot go behind it to some 
supposed underlying substance. This is the well-known principle of Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v. Duke of Westminster [1936] A.C. 1. This is a cardinal principle but it 
must not be overstated or overextended. While obliging the court to accept documents or 
transactions, found to be genuine, as such, it does not compel the court to look at a 
document or a transaction in blinkers, isolated from any context to which it properly 
belongs. If it can be seen that a document or transaction was intended to have effect as 
part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as an ingredient of a wider transaction 
intended as a whole, there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it being so regarded: to do 
so is not to prefer form to substance, or substance to form. It is the task of the court to 
ascertain the legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax or a tax 
consequence and if that emerges from a series or combination of transactions, intended to 
operate as such, it is that series or combination which may be regarded. For this there is 
authority in the law relating to income tax and capital gains tax: see Chinn v. 
Hochstrasser [1981] A.C. 533 and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Plummer [1980] 
A.C. 896.”  
 
Secondly, Lord Wilberforce also confirmed that the duty of the Court was to apply the 
specific legislation giving accord to the transactional basis of the taxpayer’s legal rights 
and obligations unless a specific rule mandated a broader approach:56 
 
“A subject is entitled to arrange his affairs so as to reduce his liability to tax. The fact that 
the motive for a transaction may be to avoid tax does not invalidate it unless a particular 
enactment so provides. It must be considered according to its legal effect.” 
 
It is the second step (the characterization issue) and the third step (the interpretation 
issue) which is the focus of the remainder of this article.  
 
                                                 
54[1982] AC 300 
55[1982] AC 300 at 323-324. 
56[1982] AC 300 at 323. His Lordship went on to note that “A subject is only to be taxed upon clear words, 
not upon ‘intendment’ or upon the ‘equity’ of an Act. Any taxing Act of Parliament is to be construed in 
accordance with this principle. What are ‘clear words’ is to be ascertained upon normal principles: these do 
not confine the courts to literal interpretation. There may, indeed should, be considered the context and 
scheme of the relevant Act as a whole, and its purpose may, indeed should, be regarded: see Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v. Wesleyan and General Assurance Society (1946) 30 T.C.ll, 16 per Lord Greene 
M.R. and Mangin v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1971] A.C. 739, 746, per Lord Donovan. The relevant 
Act in these cases is the Finance Act 1965, the purpose of which is to impose a tax on gains less allowable 
losses, arising from disposals.” 
 
 
V. Interest deductibility and the characterisation issue 
 
In Part Five the authors move on to apply the conceptual framework to the 
characterisation of interest. A priori we predict that the taxing authority and the Court 
should adopt a form approach to this task as the basic scheme and purpose of the 
“generic” Commonwealth tax system uses a transactional measurement basis in place of a 
net accretions or comprehensive income base. Also it should be noted that at common 
law stare decisis dictates that a form approach is adopted.57 
 
Form and substance  – the issue stated 
 
The issue of form and substance in the context of taxation is an extremely important 
issue. The particular characterisation adopted by the taxing authority may well give rise 
to a different incidence of tax to that proposed by the taxpayer. A good example of the 
issue is found in the leading decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Mills v 
Dowdall,58 a case concerning the characterisation of transactions where a gift duty 
avoidance scheme had been undertaken. The background to the case was that the parties 
had been married in 1964 and had separated in 1977. The case involved the division of 
matrimonial property under the former Matrimonial Property Act 1976 (NZ). 
 
As part of an asset planning structure (which also avoided the imposition of gift duty) the 
father and mother of the husband had transferred certain assets to their son being shares 
in a private company and a holiday home. On 24 August 1967 the husband’s father 
transferred 350 shares in a family company to the husband for a stated consideration of 
$2 per share. On the same day the father executed a deed of forgiveness of the whole 
debt. The husband’s mother, on 8 April 1975, executed a transfer of a house property to 
the husband for a consideration of $47,500, the whole of which was secured by a first 
mortgage back. On the same day the debt so secured was reduced by $4000 by gift and 
on 8 February 1977 a further $7500 was forgiven. The balance of $36,000 remained 
owing, but it was accepted by both spouses that at the time of the transfer it was the 
mother’s intention that the house would eventually become the husband’s property free of 
encumbrances without any payment being made by him; although there was no binding 
obligation on the mother to continue the gifting programme.  
 
                                                 
57See the recent High Court affirmation of the objective form approach in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v 
Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 342 at para 40. “This Court, in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP 
Paribas[208 ALR 213], has recently reaffirmed the principle of objectivity by which the rights and 
liabilities of the parties to a contract are determined. It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the 
parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each 
party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe. 
References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a 
reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement. 
The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would 
have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the 
surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction.” 
58Per Richardson J in Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154. 
 
 
The only issue before the Court of Appeal was whether these two items were excluded 
from the matrimonial property by s 10(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 as having 
been acquired by the husband “by gift from a third person”. There had been no 
intermingling with other matrimonial property. 
 
The husband in effect chose to argue that both assets were acquired by way of gift by 
characterising the legal effect of each series of transactions based on their economic 
substance. Here, the end result of each series of transactions, was that the husband had 
acquired each asset without paying for them. Thus he argued it was a ‘gift” of the 
property in each case and excluded from the matrimonial pool. 
 
By way of contrast the legal form of the series of transactions was that two separate 
transactions were effected in each case. First, there was a transfer of the asset for value 
(the debt). Second, part of the debt was gifted. 
 
The Court of Appeal firmly rejected the argument advanced by the husband. Richardson J 
noted:59 
 
“On those facts the legal answer seems straightforward and obvious. The appellant 
acquired both the legal title and the equitable ownership of the shares in one case and the 
land in the other. He did so under the instrument of transfer. As property acquired by the 
appellant after the marriage it was brought within the matrimonial property net by s 8(e) 
unless excluded by any other provision of that legislation. The only such exclusion 
provision relied on is s 10(1). Giving the material words of that subsection their natural 
and ordinary meaning, the property in question acquired by the husband was not acquired 
by gift. It was acquired by purchase and the contractual obligation of the appellant to pay 
the agreed purchase price became the subject of the deed (or deeds) of forgiveness. On 
that analysis the gift in each case was of a monetary sum by way of forgiveness of that 
debt, not of the shares or the land.” 
 
The Judge went on to observe that on the basis of this approach and the material before 
the Court it was not possible to warrant characterising the transaction in each case as 
involving a gift of the property the subject of the transfer (that is of the land and the 
shares). There was no evidence to suggest that the true bargain between father and son 
(and mother and son) was not fairly reflected in the legal arrangements that were entered 
into and carried out. The father could have executed a transfer of the shares by way of 
gift. The final position of the parties as between themselves at the end of the day would 
then have been the same as was achieved in the two steps that were employed. He elected 
not to do so60 but instead chose to sell the shares to his son and to forgive the resulting 
indebtedness. The mother, too, could have transferred the house property to the son by 
way of gift had she been prepared to incur a substantial liability for gift duty. She chose 
                                                 
59Per Richardson J in Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154 at 159.  
60Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154 at 161.  
 
 
not to do so and in terms of the legal arrangements entered into the appellant acquired the 
ownership of the land by purchase, not gift.61 
 
The traditional approach in tax cases 
 
Traditionally, the Commonwealth courts have adopted a form approach in tax cases.62 
Such an approach was recognised by the decision of the House of Lords in IRC v Duke of 
Westminster although it was already a well accepted canon of legal construction in the 
context of the common law.63 Why Westminster was important was that it applied the 
form approach in a tax case and was one that involved a deliberate scheme to minimise 
tax. 
 
Westminister has subsequently been accepted and endorsed by the Appellant courts in 
both Australia,64 Canada65 and New Zealand.66 For instance it was applied in New 
Zealand by the decision of the Privy Council in CIR v Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd67 and the 
Court of Appeal in Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2).68 In Finnigan v CIR69 Richardson J 
observed: 
 
“The legal principles governing the characterisation of transactions and payments made 
under transactions are well settled. Parties are free to choose whatever lawful 
arrangements will suit their purpose. The true nature of their transaction can only be 
ascertained by careful consideration of the legal arrangements actually entered into and 
carried out. That does not turn on an assessment of the broad substance of the transaction 
or of the overall economic consequences to the parties or of legal consequences which 
would follow from an alternative course which they could have adopted but chose not to 
do. It is the legal character of the transactions that is actually entered into and the legal 
steps which are followed which are decisive. The only exceptions to those principles are 
where the essential genuineness of the transaction is challenged and sham is established 
and where there is a statutory provision such as a s [BG 1] of the Income Tax Act 
                                                 
61Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154 at 161. Per Richardson J at 161 “The reason why the Courts have adopted the 
approach I have been discussing is obvious enough. Commercial men are entitled to order their affairs to 
achieve the legal and lawful results which they intend. If they deliberately enter into a genuine transaction 
intended to operate according to its tenor, those intentions should be recognised. It is what they choose to 
do that counts and their rights and obligations should be determined on that basis except where the 
legislation has itself directed otherwise.” 
62Australia: Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v FCT (1962–1964) 111 CLR 430. Canada: Stubart Investments Ltd v The 
Queen (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 1. New Zealand: Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154. United Kingdom: [1936] AC 1. 
63See Lord Wright MR in IRC v Ramsay (1935) 20 TC 79 at 94.  
64Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v FCT (1962–1964) 111 CLR 430.  
65Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 1. 
66Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154. 
67[1971] NZLR 641. 
68[1978] 2 NZLR 136; Buckley & Young Ltd v CIR (1978) 3 NZTC 61,271 [1978] 2 NZLR 485 and Mills v 
Dowdall [1983] NZLR 154.  
69 (1995) 17 NZTC 12,170 at p 12,173 
 
 
[2007]70 mandating a broader or different approach which applies in the circumstances of 
the particular case”. 
 
While the traditional position on form and substance was fairly well settled the advent of 
the doctrine of “fiscal nullity” in the United Kingdom71 starting in the early 1980’s did 
cause many commentators to question whether a “new” approach in taxation cases was 
afoot.72 This is indeed a key issue in the substantive parts of this article in the specific 
context of interest payments but the authors briefly consider the point next. 
 
The new awakening? 
 
In W T Ramsay Ltd v IRC73 many commentators argue that a new substance approach to 
tax cases (in particular those involving tax avoidance) was developed by the House of 
Lords.74 The normal claim is that the House of Lords developed a “judicial general anti-
avoidance rule” that allowed transactions (or a series thereof) that had been undertaken 
for no bona fide purpose other than to minimise tax to be disregarded – in other words – a 
“fiscal nullity”.75 The searing intelligence behind such observations failed however to 
provide any juridical basis for such a doctrine unless of course these fiscal pundits were 
wholly unaware of the rule of law and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.76 Indeed 
in Westmoreland Investments Ltd v MacNiven (HMIT)77 Lord Hoffmann expressly made 
this point on the subject of fiscal nullity: 
 
“My Lords, I am bound to say that this does not look to me like a principle of 
construction at all. There is ultimately only one principle of construction, namely to 
ascertain what Parliament meant by using the language of the statute. All other 
‘principles of construction’ can be no more than guides which past judges have put 
forward, some more helpful or insightful than others, to assist in the task of 
interpretation. But Mr McCall’s formulation looks like an overriding legal principle, 
superimposed upon the whole of revenue law without regard to the language or purpose 
                                                 
70 A general anti-avoidance income tax rule otherwise known as a GAAR. 
71See W T Ramsay Ltd v IRC [1982] AC 300.  
72See for instance Gammie M., “After Dawson” (1984) 5:3 (August) Fiscal Studies 0143-5671 at 41. See 
also Gammie M., “Tax planning after Dawson”, (1984) 2 Law and Tax Review at 26-34. 
73 [1982] AC 300. 
74Ward D.A., et al, “The Business Purpose Test and Abuse of Rights” [l985] BTR 68. 
75See Tiley J., and Jensen E., “The Control of Avoidance: the United States Experience” [1998] BTR 161.  
76See a real life application of this point in the famous case Fitzgerald v Muldoon and Others [1976] 2 
NZLR 615. A purported suspension of the New Zealand Superannuation Act 1974 by the then Prime 
Minister, the Hon R D Muldoon was held to be illegal within the meaning of s 1 of the Bill of Rights 
(1688) (Eng) by Chief Justice Wild who noted at 620: “I am bound to hold that in so doing he was 
purporting to suspend the law without consent of Parliament. Parliament had made the law. Therefore the 
law could be amended or suspended only by Parliament or with the authority of Parliament. ‘The principle 
of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined 
has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no 
person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation 
of Parliament’ (Dicey's Law of the Constitution (10th ed.) 39).’” 
77[2001] BTC 44 at 51. 
 
 
of any particular provision, save for the possibility of rebuttal by language which can be 
brought within his final parenthesis. This cannot be called a principle of construction 
except in the sense of some paramount provision subject to which everything else must 
be read, like s. 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. But the courts have no 
constitutional authority to impose such an overlay upon the tax legislation and, as I hope 
to demonstrate, they have not attempted to do so.” (authors’ emphasis). 
Despite all the rhetoric the House of Lords in one of the more recent decisions on the 
subject - Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson (HM Inspector of Taxes)78 
observed in a joint judgment: 
 
“Cases such as these gave rise to a view that, in the application of any taxing statute, 
transactions or elements of transactions which had no commercial purpose were to be 
disregarded. But that is going too far. It elides the two steps which are necessary in the 
application of any statutory provision: first, to decide, on a purposive construction, 
exactly what transaction will answer to the statutory description and secondly, to decide 
whether the transaction in question does so.” 
 
In other words, in Barclays Mercantile, the House of Lords confirmed that in the absence 
of an avoidance provision, a court did not have the power to nullify a transaction for tax 
purposes simply because of an underlying tax avoidance purpose (or in the wider context 
of this article some other aspect of public policy), when considering whether another 
specific provision of the taxing legislation applied to the same transaction. 
 
The true effect of “fiscal nullity” 
 
As stated in other contexts by the authors79 it is preferable to rationalise the doctrine of 
“fiscal nullity” on purely orthodox grounds having regard to the three component steps of 
the assessment process, the finding of fact, the construction of the legal arrangements and 
the application of the taxing legislation. It is submitted that the ambit of the W T Ramsay 
Ltd was thus confined by the House of Lords in Barclays Mercantile to ensuring that the 
interpretation of taxing legislation was approached on a “purposive basis” and that in 
construing legal transactions, while the form approach still applied, closer scrutiny would 
be made of the “legal transactions” to see what the their true effect in law was. There was 
also it is further submitted much more emphasis placed on objective findings of fact 
relying on circumstantial evidence.80 This is evident in the following observation in the 
same case:81 
 
                                                 
78[2004] BTC 414 at 423. 
79Ohms C.M., “Macniven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd: The role in New Zealand of Fiscal Nullity” 
(2001) 3 New Zealand Journal of Taxation and Policy 195 – 226. 
80See for instance in another context which could easily be termed “fiscal nullity” the decision of the High 
Court of Australia in FCT v Myer Emporium Ltd 163 CLR 199 at 209 per Mason ACJ, Wilson, Brennan, 
Deane and Dawson JJ “But a gain made otherwise than in the ordinary course of carrying on the business 
which nevertheless arises from a transaction entered into by the taxpayer with the intention or purpose of 
making a profit or gain may well constitute income. Whether it does depends very much on the 
circumstances[ objective facts] of the case.” (authors’ emphasis). 
81[2004] BTC 414 at 422. 
 
 
“The essence of the new approach was to give the statutory provision a purposive 
construction in order to determine the nature of the transaction to which it was intended 
to apply and then to decide whether the actual transaction (which might involve 
considering the overall effect of a number of elements intended to operate together) 
answered to the statutory description. Of course this does not mean that the courts have to 
put their reasoning into the straitjacket of first construing the statute in the abstract and 
then looking at the facts. It might be more convenient to analyse the facts and then ask 
whether they satisfy the requirements of the statute. But however one approaches the 
matter, the question is always whether the relevant provision of statute, upon its true 
construction, applies to the facts as found.” 
 
We now move on to consider the characterization of interest and to show that the form 
approach is indeed appropriate. 
 
 
The legal nature of interest and its characterisation  
 
When analysed correctly, “interest” is in fact a generic term that includes both the 
traditional payment as consideration for a loan of money and compensation for money 
had and received. In Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v CIR82 Richardson P 
recognized this point:  
 
“interest is not a technical word. It is not confined to payment for the use of money lent. 
The word is commonly used to describe compensation for delay in payment of amounts 
due in respect of late payment, for example, of trade debts. Where it relates to delay in 
making a payment of a particular character, it may readily be ascribed that same 
character”  
 
From a taxation perspective both forms of “interest” may be potentially deductible. 
 
Interest as compensation 
 
The first type of “interest” the authors examine is broadly what may be termed 
“compensatory interest” – this arises as compensation for monies payable on a debt 
which arises otherwise than from money lent. As an example under the Companies Act 
1993 (NZ), s 301confers on the High Court the right to order repayment or restoration of 
money, and interest on that money, in the liquidation of companies. It should be noted 
that under the common law or equity there was historically no right to compensation for 
the time value of money in respect of a debt arising by operation of law. In the leading 
decision of Lord Denning MR in the English Court of Appeal - Jefford and another v 
Gee83 his Lordship notes:84 
                                                 
82 (2000) 19 NZTC 15,614 at p 15,625. 
83 [1970] 1 All ER 1202 at 1205. 
 
 
 
“The rule of the common law of England was that, in the absence of express agreement, 
interest could not be recovered on a debt or damages and equity in this respect followed 
the law.” 
 
A similar position was reached in relation to the New Zealand taxing legislation in 
Chatswood Estate Limited v CIR.85  
 
Characterisation of compensatory interest 
 
While these cases consider whether interest may be awarded as part of a claim in 
common law or equity the alternate situation recognized in Jefford was where there was 
an express agreement by the parties. The critical point here is that it is still a matter of 
contractual interpretation or of identifying the statutory basis of the particular charge to 
decide the exact juridical nature of the interest obligation. An economic equivalence 
approach is totally inappropriate. 
 
Conclusive authority on this point is the decision of the Privy Council in Fahey v MSD 
Speirs Ltd.86 In MSD Speirs Ltd the respondent, a supplier of building materials, allowed 
a discount for prompt payment, but if an account was overdue for a period of three 
months interest was added at the rate of one percent per month. On 1 December 1968 the 
Fahey Construction Co Ltd was indebted to the respondent in the sum of $10,070.06 and 
faced with a refusal by the respondent to supply further materials unless the account was 
paid or security given. On 2 December 1968 the appellant signed a personal guarantee 
that he would “pay for any materials which are purchased from M S D Speirs Ltd by 
Fahey Construction Co Ltd in the event of Fahey Construction Co Ltd not being in a 
position to do so.” Fahey Construction went into liquidation and the appellant sought to 
avoid the personal guarantee (inter alia) by reason of the fact that the respondent’s terms 
of business included the provisions as to interest and thus the company was a money 
lender within the meaning of the former Moneylenders Act 1908 (NZ) and was not 
registered. Section 2 of that Act held that with certain exceptions the term “moneylender” 
included every person (whether an individual, a firm, a society or a corporate body) 
whose business was that of moneylending or who advertised or announced himself or 
held himself out in any way as carrying on that business.  
 
Lord Morris delivering the judgment of the Privy Council observed:87  
 
“Their Lordships see no evidence at all that the respondent was carrying on the ‘business’ 
of moneylending. The respondent’s letter to its customers in April 1967 showed that its 
genuine concern and desire was that accounts should be paid and should not be 
                                                                                                                                                 
84 Lord Denning also referred to the comments of Best CJ in Arnott v Redfern (1826) 3 Bing 353 (at p 359) 
to support his conclusion. 
85 (1995) 17 NZTC 12,129. 
86 [1975] 1 NZLR 240. 
87[1975] 1 NZLR 240 at 246. 
 
 
outstanding. The reason why interest was to be charged on overdue amounts was so that 
prompt payment would be encouraged. There were none of the elements of a disguised 
loan transaction. The transactions were genuine sale transactions. To regard purchasers 
who were dilatory in their payments to a vendor as being borrowers from a moneylender 
would be wholly irrational.” 
 
Hence the Privy Council were quite prepared to conclude “interest” was properly 
chargeable as regards an overdue debt but at the same time not prepared to characterise 
the underlying transaction as a “loan of money”. This approach was amplified by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Re Securitibank88 where Richardson J notes “It is the 
legal character of the transaction which is decisive, not the overall economic 
consequences to the parties …”.89 If a statutory provision giving rise to an interest charge 
is at issue, then, the normal purposive approach to statutory interpretation is mandated. 
For instance in New Zealand - formerly s 5(j) Acts Interpretation Act 1924 (NZ) and now 
s 5(1) Interpretation Act 1999 (NZ) mandates a purposive approach. Under such an 
approach the words used in an enactment are to be considered in light of the objects 
which the statute and the part of the legislation at issue is intended to achieve.90 In the 
leading decision Challenge Corp Ltd v CIR Richardson J (as he then was) notes:91 
 
“In the end the legal answer must turn on an overall assessment of the respective roles of 
the particular provision and s 99 under the statute and of the relation between them. That 
                                                 
88[1978] 2 NZLR 136.  
89[1978] 2 NZLR 136 at 167. Richardson J went on to observe (at 169) that the legal rights and obligations 
were not to be determined conclusively by the nomenclature used by the parties. Consideration must be 
given to the whole of the contract in order to determine the true nature of the relationship. If the transaction 
was embodied in a number of interrelated agreements, all the agreements must be considered together and 
one may be read to explain the others. The first question then in this class of case was: what is the 
substance of the bargain as disclosed by the documents before the Court (Re George Inglefield [1933] Ch 1, 
at 24). In arriving at the answer to that question, the circumstances surrounding the entering into the 
transactions may be taken into account. This did not mean that evidence is admissible to vary or contradict 
the written agreement; only that before you construe the agreement you are entitled to understand the 
setting in which it was made and that you construe it against that background. While then it was legitimate 
to take into account surrounding circumstances and to look at the documents as a whole, the documents 
themselves might be brushed aside only if and to the extent that the parties had a common intention that 
they were not to create the legal rights and obligations which they gave the appearance of creating and in 
that sense were shams. Finally, the concern was with the legal arrangements actually carried out. It was 
what the parties eventually did that counts, not what they may initially have agreed to do. In some cases the 
parties may have departed from the initial agreement, in which event questions of a new agreement or 
variation of the original agreement, or estoppel, or sham in operation may arise. But that was not in 
question here and required no further consideration. It was also unnecessary on the facts of this case to 
consider further the two qualifications to the principle that the rights and obligations of the parties to an 
agreement are determined according to the terms of the agreement which have been adverted to: first, 
where the essential genuineness of the documentation of the arrangements is challenged and sham is 
alleged; and second, where there is a statutory provision directing a broader or different approach designed 
to prevent the erosion of the policy of the legislation by refusing recognition to attempts to structure 
arrangements so as to take them outside or bring them within the statutory provision as the case may be, or 
by directing attention to the end result or economic purpose of the transaction. 
90 See the excellent discussion by Somers J in the leading New Zealand Court of Appeal case Donselaar v 
Donsellar [1982] 1 NZLR 97 at 114. 
91 [1986] 2 NZLR 513 at 549 (CA). 
 
 
is a matter of statutory construction and the twin pillars on which the approach to statutes 
mandated by s 5(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 rests are the scheme of the 
legislation and the relevant objectives of the legislation. Consideration of the scheme of 
the legislation requires a careful reading in its historical context of the whole statute, 
analysing its structure and examining the relationships between the various provisions 
and recognising any discernible themes and patterns and underlying policy 
considerations.” 
 
The High Court of Australia in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v FCT92, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Stubart Investments v The Queen93 and the House of Lords 
in WT Ramsay v IRC94 have all approved of purposive interpretation in the context of 
taxation legislation of whatever description. 
 
Interest as a return for money lent 
 
The second type of “interest” covered by the principle discussed by Lord Denning in 
Jefford was where the underlying transaction was a “loan of money” with the 
consideration being the payment of interest by the debtor to the creditor.95 In this 
situation the correct characterisation of the underlying loan is critical. In Re Securitibank 
Ltd the Court of Appeal analyses the nature of a “loan of money”. Richardson J states:96 
 
“The third is that the essence of a loan of money is the payment of a sum of money on 
condition that at some future time an equivalent amount will be repaid. In this case it was 
accepted by the respondent that the payment of the acceptance fee could not be 
characterised as a loan …” 
 
A similar approach is also found in the leading decision Chow Yoong Hong v Choong 
Fah Rubber Manufactory97 where Lord Devlin, delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council states:  
 
“There are many ways of raising cash besides borrowing. One is by selling book-debts 
and another by selling unmatured bills, in each case for less than their face value. 
Another might be to buy goods on credit or against a post-dated cheque and immediately 
sell them in the market for cash. Their Lordships are, of course, aware, as was Branson J 
[in Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275], that transactions of 
this sort can easily be used as a cloak for moneylending.”  
 
The critical point to take from Chow Yoong Hong is that at common law, the “task of the 
court in such cases is clear. It must first look at the nature of the transaction which the 
                                                 
92 (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320 – 321. 
93 (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 1 at 32. 
94 [1982] AC 300 at 323. 
95Re National Bank of Wales Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 629. 
961978] 2 NZLR 136 at 167. 
97[1962] AC 209 at 216-217).In Re Securitibank Ltd (at pp 166 – 167) Richardson J 
 
 
parties have agreed. If in form it is not a loan, it is not to the point to say that its object 
was to raise money for one of them or that the parties could have produced the same 
result more conveniently by borrowing and lending money.”98  
 
Characterisation of interest on money lent 
 
As has already been noted above, the characterisation of a transaction as one of a loan of 
money with interest is governed by the normal rules of contractual interpretation – clearly 
following a form basis. In the leading decisions of the Court of Appeal in Buckley & 
Young,99 Finnegan100 and Boat Park Ltd v Hutchinson101 a series of guidelines have been 
established: 
 
1. In deciding the character of the payments and benefits provided in an agreement it 
is necessary to determine the true nature of the legal arrangements pursuant to 
which the payments were made and the benefits provided;102  
2. It is well established that the true nature of a transaction must be ascertained by 
reference to the legal arrangements actually entered into and carried out.103 
3. It is the legal character of the transaction actually entered into determined by the 
contractual arrangements which is decisive, not the overall economic 
consequences to the parties.104  
                                                 
98[1961] 3 All ER 1163 at 1167. In Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275 at 279. 
Branson J pithily put the argument raised by the defendants that the legal form of the particular transactions 
could be ignored despite having executed the proper documentation in these terms: “However, it is said on 
behalf of the defendants: ‘In spite of the fact that we have entered into the agreements which are before the 
court, and which in express terms are agreements for the purchase and payment of book debts, we ask the 
court to say that that does not represent the real transaction between the parties, and that the real transaction 
between the parties was not a transaction of purchase and sale, but a mere moneylending transaction to be 
repaid by monthly payments secured by bills of exchange.’ No evidence has been called by the defendants 
of anybody who was a party to these agreements who has dared to come into the witness-box and say that 
that was the fact of the case. That is not surprising, because, when people of sound understanding and 
business experience put their hands to an agreement which expressly says that it is an agreement for the 
absolute sale and purchase of book debts, it is asking a good deal for those persons to come before the court 
and to say: ‘Notwithstanding that we entered into that agreement, it is quite untrue to recite, as we have 
recited, that the fact was that we were entering into an ordinary transaction of loan, and the reason why we 
want the court to believe us when we say that is that we shall be able to take advantage of the 
Moneylenders Act and repudiate the agreement into which we have entered.’” 
99[1978] 2 NZLR 485.  
100(1995) 17 NZTC 12,170.  
101 [1999] 2 NZLR 74. 
102Per Richardson J in Buckley & Young Ltd v CIR [1978] 2 NZLR 485at 489 - the starting point is to 
consider the documentation embodying the transaction. In IRC v Ramsay (1935) 20 TC 79 at 94 Lord 
Wright MR observed: “The decision in any particular case can only be arrived at by considering what is the 
substance of the transaction in question, and what is the substance of that transaction can only be 
ascertained by a careful consideration of the contract which embodies the transaction.” 
103Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Wesleyan and General Assurance Society (1946) 30 TC 11. See also 
Nicholls v CIR [1965] NZLR 836 at 845. 
104 In this context see IRC v Duke of Wesminister [1936] AC 1 at 25 Lord Russell of Killowen said: “If all 
that is meant by the doctrine is that having once ascertained the legal rights of the parties you may 
disregard mere nomenclature and decide the question of taxability or non-taxability in accordance with the 
 
 
4. While the nomenclature used by the parties is not decisive, it is the legal rights 
and duties created by the transaction into which the parties entered and as 
ascertained by ordinary legal principles, taking into account surrounding 
circumstances, that must be determined. Following Lord Hoffmann’s careful 
remarks in the decision of the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme 
Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society several points on contractual interpretation 
are now part of the jurisprudence.105  
5. Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would 
reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at 
the time of the contract.106 
6. The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v 
Simmonds107 as the “matrix of fact”, but this phrase is, if anything, an understated 
description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it 
should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be 
mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the 
way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a 
reasonable man.108 
7. Thus, while it is legitimate to take into account surrounding circumstances and to 
refuse to be blinded by terms employed in documents, the documents themselves 
may be brushed aside only if and to the extent that they are shams, in the sense of 
not being bona fide in inception or of not having been acted upon, and are only 
used in whole or in part as a cloak to conceal a different transaction or if required 
by a provision such as s BG 1 Income Tax Act 2007.109 
8. The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of 
the parties and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in 
an action for rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical 
policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would 
interpret utterances in ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception are in some 
respects unclear. But this is not the occasion on which to explore them110. 
                                                                                                                                                 
legal rights, well and good …. If, on the other hand, the doctrine means that you may brush aside deeds, 
disregard the legal rights and liabilities arising under a contract between parties, and decide the question of 
taxability or non-taxability upon the footing of the rights and liabilities of the parties being different from 
what in law they are, then I entirely dissent from such a doctrine”. 
105[1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114 – 115.  
106[1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114. 
107[1971] 3 All ER 237 at 239-240. Lord Wilberforce notes: “In order for the agreement of 6 July 1960 to 
be understood, it must be placed in its context. The time has long passed when agreements, even those 
under seal, were isolated from the matrix of facts in which they were set and interpreted purely on internal 
linguistic considerations. There is no need to appeal here to any modern, anti-literal, tendencies, for Lord 
Blackburn’s well-known judgment in River Wear Comrs v Adamson ((1877) 2 A Cas 743 at 763, [1874–
80] All ER Rep 1 at 11) provides ample warrant for a liberal approach. We must, as he said, enquire 
beyond the language and see what the circumstances were with reference to which the words were used, 
and the object, appearing from those circumstances, which the person using them had in view.” (authors 
emphasis). 
108[1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114. 
109See Richardson J in Mills v Dowdall [1983] 154 at 159-160. 
110 Cf “entire” agreement clause in Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd [2010] NZSC 5 paras 13 & 
14. 
 
 
9. The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a 
reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of 
words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is 
what the parties using those words against the relevant background would 
reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely 
enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words 
which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to 
conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or 
syntax. 111 
10. The “rule” that words should be given their “natural and ordinary meaning” 
reflects the commonsense proposition that we do not easily accept that people 
have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other 
hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something 
must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to 
attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had.112  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
“The conclusion to which I have already come about the meaning of “$6.50 per GJ” is merely reinforced if 
reference is made to the negotiations between the parties which led to the letter of 15 October 2004. The 
traditional view has been that it is impermissible to have regard to negotiations when interpreting a 
contract. The House of Lords has recently confirmed that view in Chartbrook and it continues to hold 
sway in Australia.7 It is not, however, an absolute rule of exception. It has no application when the 
negotiations are considered “not in order to provide a gloss on the terms of the contract, but rather to 
establish the parties’ knowledge of the circumstances with reference to which they use the words in the 
contract”.8 Those circumstances include, just as much as “the genesis of the transaction, the background, 
the context, the market in which the parties are operating”,9 the subject matter of the intended contract as 
Mason J made clear in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW):10 
Obviously the prior negotiations will tend to establish objective background facts which were known to 
both parties and the subject matter of the contract. To the extent to which they have this tendency they are 
admissible. 
 
The scope of the subject matter in part defines “the commercial or business object of the transaction 
objectively ascertained”, which Lord Wilberforce himself in Prenn v Simmonds11 considered to be a 
surrounding fact to which reference could be made. Differing in this respect from the view McGrath J takes 
as to the extent of what he calls the “subject matter exception”,12 I see no reason why it can be called in 
aid, if necessary, for the purpose of ascertaining that the contract was concerned with a gas supply but not 
to learn that it dealt with gas only. If there is, as I think, a subject matter exception, there cannot sensibly be 
degrees of subject matter. There is of course an important qualification that any material which is simply 
declarative of the subjective intentions of one party must be disregarded. But there is no reason in principle 
why the Court should not have regard to communications between the parties for the light they may throw 
upon the objective commercial purpose and, in particular, what ground the contract was to cover. The 
question of how much further the courts of this country should go towards admitting evidence of 
negotiations for the light they may shed on the objective intention of the parties can be left for another 
day.” 
 
111[1998] 1 All ER 98 at 115 (see Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 3 
All ER 352, [1997] 2 WLR 945). 
112[1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114. Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said in Antaios Cia 
Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB, The Antaios [1984] 3 All ER 229 at 233, [1985] AC 191 at 201 “if 
detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a 
conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common sense.” 
 
 
11. A deed or other instrument must be construed as a whole and, if the transaction is 
embodied in a number or complex of interrelated agreements, then all the 
agreements must be considered together and one may be read to explain the 
others.113  
 
Possibly the rule at point eleven is one of the most overlooked yet important when it 
comes to taxation issues regarding a “loan of money”. More than once a taxing authority 
in at least one of the jurisdictions reviewed has indeed tried to “amalgamate” several 
quite separate legal contracts to re-characterise that series of contracts as one 
“economically equivalent” arrangement or transaction.114  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our preliminary view is that the predicted result from applying the conceptual framework 
a priori to the issue of the characterisation of interest is proven a posteriori having regard 
to the manner in which the Commonwealth Courts construe legal obligations generally 
and specifically which concern money lending and forms of debt giving rise to interest. 
This is a logical extension of the fact that the modified Haig/Simons tax base we present 
uses transactions as the basic unit of measurement. We also note that in other areas of 
commercial law where legislation is superimposed over common law contractual forms 
the same policy process may been seen. In Re Securitibank Ltd Richardson J made a 
similar point concerning the application of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 (NZ), s 55(1). 
His Honour noted that the apparent “legislative policy” reflected in the bills of exchange 
legislation. Richardson J observed:115 
 
                                                 
113See Manks v Whitely [1912] 1 Ch 735.  
114See Shell Canada Ltd v Canada [1999] 3 SCR 622. In 1988, Shell required approximately US$100 
million for general corporate purposes. To get the money at the lowest possible after-tax cost, first, it 
entered into debenture agreements with three foreign lenders borrowing NZ$150 million at the market rate 
of 15.4 percent per annum. Shell was required to make 10 semi-annual interest payments of NZ$11.55 
million. The principal was to be returned to the lenders in 1993. Second, Shell entered into a forward 
exchange contract with a foreign bank, pursuant to which it used the NZ$150 million to purchase 
approximately US$100 million. The forward exchange contract also allowed Shell to exchange a specified 
amount of US dollars for NZ$11.55 million on each day that a semi-annual payment to the lenders was due, 
and to exchange another specified amount of US dollars for NZ$150 million when the time came to repay 
the principal to the lenders. The exchange rates in the forward exchange contract were established by 
reference to the forward exchange rates for NZ dollars for the period of the loan. When computing its 
income for tax purposes, Shell relied on s. 20(1)(c) of the ITA and deducted the interest, calculated at the 
rate of 15.4 percent per annum, that it had paid under the debenture agreements. For its 1993 taxation year, 
Shell reported a capital gain of approximately US$21 million. The Minister of National Revenue reassessed 
Shell for the 1992 and 1993 taxation years on the basis that it was only permitted to deduct interest at the 
rate it would have paid had it borrowed US dollars, i.e., 9.1 percent per annum. The claimed capital gain for 
the 1993 taxation year was also reassessed as being on income account. The Tax Court of Canada set aside 
the Minister’s reassessment. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeal but held that Shell 
could claim the net foreign exchange gain on capital account. Shell appealed to the Supreme Court on the 
interest rate issue and the Minister cross-appealed on the capital gain issue. McLachlin J at para 39 rejected 
the notion the separate contracts could be amalgamated as one. 
115[1978] 2 NZLR 136 at173. 
 
 
“By drawing a bill the drawer engages that on due presentation it will be accepted and 
paid according to its tenor (Bills of Exchange Act 1908 [(NZ)], s 55(1)). And it is basic to 
the law of negotiable instruments that negotiation transfers title: and it does not operate as 
a charge or mortgage. It derogates from the commercial principles inherent in bills of 
exchange legislation not to allow genuine documents, which are in form bills and which 
are assigned in accordance with legal requirements, to take effect according to their 
terms. That may be required in some cases. For example, where bills of exchange are 
made or given in relation to transactions which are governed by regulatory legislation, the 
acquisition or transfer of rights by the use of bills may in turn be qualified or controlled 
by the terms of that legislation.”  
 
Richardson J concluded that the policy of the bills of exchange legislation reinforced the 
importance of determining the true nature of a transaction involving the use of bills in 
accordance with the terms of the documents and agreements actually entered into and 
carried out. This is directly analogous with the approach advocated here by the authors. 
 
VI. The interpretation issue 
 
In Part Six the authors apply the conceptual framework to the issue of the application of 
statutory deduction provisions in the Commonwealth (the interpretation issue). To be 
clear our focus in this article is to consider whether the same approach seen in Re 
Securitibank Ltd applies in the case of interest. In other words does the generic policy of 
the Commonwealth income tax systems we have reviewed (and that admittedly adopt a 
transactional measurement basis) make as paramount the importance of determining the 
true nature of a transaction involving the interest contracts in accordance with the terms 
of the documents and agreements actually entered into and carried out? A priori we 
would conclude that this is indeed the case and the concept of ectopia illustrates this 
point. 
 
Schema of Part Six 
 
A priori we predict that the taxing authority and the Court should adopt a form approach 
to this task as the basic scheme and purpose of the “generic” Commonwealth tax system 
uses a transactional measurement basis in place of a net accretions or comprehensive 
income base. However as noted in cases such as Usher’s Wiltshire Brewery Ltd v 
Bruce116 by Earl Loreburn this is subject to the caveat that the specific legislation may 
modify such an approach: 
 
“The reasons given were that profits and gains must be estimated on ordinary principles 
of commercial trading by setting against the income earned the cost of earning it, subject 
to the limitations prescribed by the Act.” (authors’emphasis). 
                                                 
116[1915] AC 433 at 444.  
 
 
We briefly review the substantive nature of the specific deduction rules in the 
jurisdictions under consideration to provide context to our main point as described above. 
 
Introduction to statutory deduction provisions 
 
While it is clearly beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed analysis of the 
statutory deduction regimes of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom117 the authors may make some general observations about the broad approach 
seen in these jurisdictions. 
 
Global vs scheduler systems 
 
In the schedular system, each of the major income flows, salaries and wages, dividends, 
rent, and profits, is subject to a different tax base and rate. The global income tax is 
imposed on income aggregated from all sources, after personal exemptions, deductions, 
and so forth, on the basis of a single rate or graduate rates.118 
 
Global systems 
 
Under a global income tax system all receipts subject to tax are aggregated and allowable 
deductions subtracted. After any allowances the rate schedule is applied appropriate to 
the entity concerned. In the case of a jurisdiction that also has a capital gains tax the net 
capital gain (or loss) is ring fenced and taxed at a preferential rate if a gain or carried 
forward separately as a capital loss. 
 
In so far as Australia and New Zealand are concerned the “general deduction rule” 
governs the deductibility of most interest incurred in relation to an income earning 
activity.119 In Canada because of the development of the jurisprudence in relation to the 
deductibility of interest under the Canadian general deduction rule, a specific provision 
was enacted.120 
 
As a broad statement all three jurisdictions (in the case of money lent at interest) look to 
the “use” of the interest in the year of deduction rather than the original purpose of the 
loan or indebtedness. For instance in the leading decision of the High Court of Australia 
in Steele v DFCT121 the majority consisting of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ 
observed that the “principal issue in this appeal concerns the deductibility, for income tax 
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purposes, of interest where the borrowed money has been used to purchase and hold a 
capital asset intended to be developed for income-producing purposes.”122 Their Honours 
went on to state:123 
 
“However, in the usual case, of which the present is an example, where interest is a 
recurrent payment to secure the use for a limited term of loan funds, then it is proper to 
regard the interest as a revenue item, and its character is not altered by reason of the fact 
that the borrowed funds are used to purchase a capital asset.”  
 
In the same vein McLachlin J Shell Canada Ltd v Canada124 observed that the correct 
approach to the “nexus” requirement to gain deductibility of interest under s 
20(1)(c)(i):125 
 
“focuse[d] not on the purpose of the borrowing per se, but rather on the taxpayer’s 
purpose in using the borrowed money. As Dickson C.J. stated in Bronfman Trust, supra, 
at p. 46, ‘the focus of the inquiry must be centered on the use to which the taxpayer put 
the borrowed funds’”. 
It is submitted a similar chain of reasoning was employed by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in the early leading decision - Public Trustee v C of T.126 In that case the issue 
before the Court of Appeal was whether interest paid on borrowed monies used to pay 
estate or death duties was deductible. The Public Trust (acting on behalf of the estate) 
would have been forced to sell income producing assets to pay the debt if borrowing had 
not arisen. Myers CJ considered that there was a sufficient connection between the 
interest and the Public Trust’s income earning assets. Myers CJ considered that the 
borrowing “left the money so borrowed or its equivalent in capital assets”.127 
 
In the narrower case of interest paid as compensation for a debt otherwise arising than by 
borrowing it is submitted that the issue will simply be a matter of whether the particular 
item has a sufficient nexus with an income earning activity – clearly when no loan of 
money has arisen at law then the interest (such as interest payable to the Crown for 
overdue tax debt) will have to be examined under different principles other than a “use” 
test. 
 
More correctly, the question should be whether the involuntary expense (such as 
compensatory interest) arises as a “working expense” of the taxpayer’s income earning 
process. 
 
For instance in the specific New Zealand context in relation to legal costs, in the leading 
Text CCH, New Zealand Income Tax Law and Practice128 it is noted there is no provision 
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of the New Zealand legislation which specifically deals with the deductibility of legal 
expenses. This means that the deductibility of legal expenses is determined by the fact 
that the character of those expenses is such that they are to be recognised as deductible 
under the general deduction provision of the - s DA 1(1)(a).  
 
In this way, the fact that the expenses are “legal expenses” is not, on its own, sufficient to 
justify deduction. Authority for that view may be found in Hallstroms Pty Ltd v FCT 
where Dixon J said:129  
 
“The claim is to deduct legal expenses, and legal expenses, we may assume, take the 
quality of an outgoing of a capital nature or of an outgoing on account of revenue from 
the cause or the purpose of incurring the expenditure. We are, therefore, remitted to a 
consideration of the object in view when the legal proceedings were undertaken, or of the 
situation which impelled the taxpayer to undertake them.” 
 
The author submits that the deduction of compensatory interest should be governed, by 
the same broad concept. The author terms this the “working expense” approach. In the 
leading decision of the High Court of Australia in John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v FCT 
Menzies J opined:130  
 
“To make a payment to acquire or to defend the acquisition of a favourable position from 
which to earn income or to enter into arrangements that will yield income is not in 
general an outlay incurred either in gaining or in carrying on business for the purpose of 
gaining assessable income; such a payment in the case of a trading company, occurs at a 
stage too remote from the receipt of income to be so regarded. To be deductible an outlay 
must be part of the cost of trading operations to produce income, i.e., it must have the 
character of a working expense.” 
 
So too for compensatory interest. The question to ask thus is whether the particular 
payment of compensatory interest (possibly interest paid on overdue trade debts or as a 
penalty under a long-term construction contract) is “ … part of the cost of trading 
operations to produce income, i.e., it must have the character of a working expense.” 
 
Schedular system 
 
Under the United Kingdom legislation and despite the simplification process a schedular 
system still remains for all practical purposes. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
consider the breadth of the United Kingdom deduction provisions save to concentrate on 
the most relevant statutory provision in terms of this discussion, s 34(1) ITTOIA 2005 
(Part 2) which relates to trading income. Under s 5 of that legislation “Income tax is 
charged on the profits of a trade, profession or vocation.” Then the more specific 
deduction rule holds in s 34(1) “In calculating the profits of a trade, no deduction is 
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allowed for … expenses not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade 
…” (authors’ emphasis).In Scorer (HMIT) v Olin Energy Systems Ltd131 Walton J 
observed about the deduction of interest under s 34(1), namely:132 
 
“… we take the view that the question whether interest was paid for the purposes of a 
trade must depend upon whether the loan, on which the interest was paid, was incurred 
for the purposes of that trade. It does not necessarily follow that the purposes of the loan 
can be ascertained by looking at the immediate use to which the borrower applies the 
money. The question is one of fact to be decided on the evidence available in each case.” 
 
It is submitted that the same use test seen in the other Commonwealth jurisdictions is 
employed in the United Kingdom context. 
 
The legislative policy of form in interest transactions 
 
Turning to our particular issue of concern in Part Six of this article we consider whether 
the same approach seen in Re Securitibank Ltd applies in the case of interest. In other 
words does the generic policy of the Commonwealth income tax systems we have 
reviewed (and that admittedly adopt a transactional measurement basis) make as 
paramount the importance of determining the true nature of a transaction involving the 
interest contracts in accordance with the terms of the documents and agreements actually 
entered into and carried out? A priori we would conclude that this is indeed the case and 
the concept of ectopia illustrates this point. 
 
In Australia Steele v DFCT133 directly confirms the authors’ point. The High Court 
concluded that:134 
 
“As was explained in Australian National Hotels Ltd v FC of T, [(1988) 19 FCR 234 at 
239-241] interest is ordinarily a recurrent or periodic payment which secures, not an 
enduring advantage, but, rather, the use of borrowed money during the term of the loan. 
According to the criteria noted by Dixon J in Sun Newspapers Ltd and Associated 
Newspapers Ltd v FC of T [(1938) 61 CLR 337 at 359-363] it is therefore ordinarily a 
revenue item.” (author’s emphasis). 
 
The High Court clearly applied the deduction provision (now s 8-1ITAA97) to the legal 
form of the transaction by reference to the “use of the borrowed money during the term of 
the loan.”135 
 
In Canada Shell Canada Ltd v Canada136 rejects outright the notion that separate loan or 
financing contracts could be amalgamated. McLachlin J concluded:137 
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“However, this Court has made it clear in more recent decisions that, absent a specific 
provision to the contrary, it is not the courts’ role to prevent taxpayers from relying on 
the sophisticated structure of their transactions, arranged in such a way that the particular 
provisions of the Act are met, on the basis that it would be inequitable to those taxpayers 
who have not chosen to structure their transactions that way.” 
 
In New Zealand the general point was also confirmed in Finnigan v CIR.138 This same 
point was applied by the New Zealand Supreme Court in the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v CIR.139 Although speaking of a forestry 
licence the same concept applied.140 Tipping, McGrath and Gault JJ noted:141 
 
“Under the legislation the licence premium is deductible if it is for ‘a right to use land’. 
Whether that is the legal character of the payment of $2,050,518 per plantable hectare 
which is to be made in 2048 requires an analysis of the nature of the arrangements 
actually entered into. The Court must construe the relevant documents, in their 
commercial context, to ascertain the parties’ obligations to each other, as if it were 
determining a dispute between them over the meaning and effect of their contractual 
arrangements.”  
 
Their Honours also went on to observe:142 
 
“On the other hand, it is the true meaning of all provisions in a contract that will 
determine the character of a transaction rather than the label given to it. The label ‘licence 
premium’ is accordingly not what is important in the present case, but rather the true 
contractual nature of the legal rights for which payment is to be made and the effect of 
applying the tax legislation to a payment of that character. Once the nature of the 
contractual rights and obligations has been determined in this way, the specific provision 
can be applied.” 
 
Finally in the United Kingdom in Westmoreland Lord Hoffmann recognized that “there 
are many terms in tax legislation which cannot be construed in this way. They refer to 
purely legal concepts which have no broader commercial meaning.” (authors’ 
emphasis).143 
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VII: Accounting treatment 
 
Introduction 
 
In part Seven the authors consider the treatment of interest and debt instruments from an 
accounting perspective. The scope of the paper only allows the New Zealand treatment to 
be considered but as New Zealand now adopts the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) this discussion is also illustrative of the other jurisdictions we review. 
 
Accounting treatment can be useful circumstantial evidence in tax cases although 
ultimately it is only one factor that the Court may take into account144. 
 
Accounting treatment of “interest” in New Zealand is related to “financial instruments” 
as interest is a cost of borrowed funds. IFRS apply in New Zealand as New Zealand 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practices. The main coverage of interest and financial 
instruments is found in the Framework for the Presentation and Preparation of Financial 
Statements (IASB) which covers in paragraph 4.33 what is determined to be expenses. 
Financial instruments are currently accounted for using IFRS New Zealand Equivalent to 
International Accounting Standard 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation: NZIAS32), 
New Zealand Equivalent to International Accounting Standard 39 (Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement: NZIAS39) and New Zealand Equivalent to International 
Financial Reporting Standard 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures: NZ IFRS 7). 
NZIAS32 Financial Instruments: Presentation, defines what a financial instrument is 
whether it is financial asset, financial liability or equity instrument. Once you have 
identified a financial instrument, NZIAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement, addresses how to recognize and measure them in the financial statements 
of the entity. NZIFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, provides detailed disclosure 
requirements for the financial instruments. 
A new standard on financial instruments - New Zealand Equivalent to International 
Financial Reporting Standard 9 (Financial instruments: NZ IFRS 9) (2010) will apply as 
mandatory adoption for any accounting periods starting after 1 January 2013. However, 
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some organization’s will choose to adopt early and therefore entities will be applying a 
mixture of models over the next few years.  
If we use the current standards to identify financial assets, liabilities and equity 
instruments we use NZIAS32. This does not change between the old and new regime. In 
the old regime, NZIAS32 and its contents were developed prior to the contents of 
NZIAS39. The reason for this was there was less debate about the presentation and 
disclosure of financial instruments than there was with the recognition and measurement. 
Therefore NZIAS32 concentrates on disclosure issues.  
The operation of NZIAS32 
Under NZIAS32 firstly, financial instruments, financial assets, financial liabilities and 
equity instruments are defined. Secondly, specified criteria relate to their amount, timing 
and certainty of future cash flows are given in the standard.  
 
The concept of a financial instrument 
 
For the purposes of the NZIAS32 a financial instrument is defined as “any contract that 
gives rise to both a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity 
instrument to another”. Therefore, there must be a contract which gives rise to one party 
having a financial asset and the other financial liability or equity instrument.145 
 
The concept of a financial asset 
 
A financial asset according to NZIAS32 paragraph 11146 is: 
 
1. Cash; or 
                                                 
145NZ IAS 32 paragraph 11: A financial instrument is any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one 
entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. 
146A financial asset is any asset that is: 
(a) cash; 
(b) an equity instrument of another entity; 
(c) a contractual right: 
(i) to receive cash or another financial asset from another entity; 
or 
(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially 
favourable to the entity; or 
(d) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and is: 
(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to receive a variable number of the entity’s own 
equity instruments; or 
(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or another 
financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this purpose the entity’s own equity 
instruments do not include puttable financial instruments classified as equity instruments in accordance with 
paragraphs 16A and 16B, instruments that impose on the entity an obligation to deliver to another party a pro rata 
share of the net assets of the entity only on liquidation and are classified as equity instruments in accordance with 
paragraphs 16C and 16D, or instruments that are contracts for the future receipt or delivery of the entity’s own 
equity instruments. 
 
 
2. A contractual right to receive cash or another financial asset from another entity; 
or 
3. A contractual right to exchange financial instruments with another entity under 
conditions that are potentially favourable; or 
4. An equity instrument of another entity. 
Examples of items that satisfy these definitions are given in paragraphs AG3-AG23. A 
contractual right to exchange financial instruments with another entity under conditions 
that are potentially favourable relates to derivatives. 
 
The concept of a financial liability 
 
A financial liability is defined by NZIAS32 paragraph 11147 to be: 
1. Any liability that is a contractual obligation: 
2. To deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or 
3. To exchange financial assets or liabilities with another entity; or 
4. A contract that is a derivative; or 
5. A non-derivative. 
The concept of an equity instrument 
 
Finally an equity instrument is defined by NZIAS32 paragraph 11)148 as “any contract 
that evidences a residual interest in the assets of another entity after deduction of all its 
liabilities.” 
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deducting all of its liabilities. 
 
 
 
 
Other observations 
 
All financial assets and liabilities should be recognized in the balance sheet when the 
entity becomes party to the contractual provisions of the instrument.  
 
NZIFRS9 (2010) uses the same definitions for financial instruments, financial assets, 
financial liabilities and equity instruments.  However, one of the reasons for the changes 
to NZIFRS9 (2010) is the recognition and measurement in NZIAS39.  Under NZIAS39 
how you measured the financial instrument depended on the classification of the financial 
asset or liability.  There were various classifications such as held to maturity, loans and 
receivables, available for sale financial assets.  This classification determined how they 
were to be measured.   Generally financial instruments are recognized initially at fair 
value of consideration given. Fair value is defined in IAS32 (paragraph 11) ‘Fair value is 
the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between 
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction’ (exact definition). 
 
One of the issues with this is that management determined how they were classified 
initially according to their objective intention and could change the classification in later 
accounting periods and hence the measurement of the financial instrument at a later date.  
This could be an area of income smoothing.   NZIFRS9 addresses this issue and makes an 
irrevocable designation to a classification at initial recognition. 
 
VIII  Conclusion 
 
The main issue the authors explore in this article is the question of whether the tax laws 
reviewed follow the common law legal form of money lending transactions giving rise to 
an interest expense and whether the scheme and purpose of the jurisdictions reviewed 
utilize the same common law forms to apply scientific interest deduction rules.  The 
answer is yes.  Haig/Simons is not a practical, thus we use transaction based 
measurement.  This in turn relies on commercial legal forms and the legislation absorbs 
this into its measurement and recognition basis.  Treatment of the actual deductibility of 
the interest expense is not looked at here (forthcoming).  Accounting IFRS (International 
Financial Reporting Standards) are recognized by the Inland Revenue Department149 also 
focuses on contractual rights. This adds to the complexity as there is a relationship 
between accounting and profit calculations. Since the tax calculations are making 
reference to accounting standards, having an awareness of the accounting standards given 
the harmonization of accounting standards is important.  The final direction that this 
mutual awareness and cross referencing takes is not yet clear.    
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